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a b s t r a c t
Sleep onset is associated with marked changes in behavioral, physiological, and subjective
phenomena. In daily life though subjective experience is the main criterion in terms of
which we identify it. But very few studies have focused on these experiences. This study
seeks to identify the subjective variables that reﬂect sleep onset. Twenty young subjects
took an afternoon nap in the laboratory while polysomnographic recordings were made.
They were awakened four times in order to assess subjective experiences that correlate
with the (1) appearance of slow eye movement, (2) initiation of stage 1 sleep, (3) initiation
of stage 2 sleep, and (4) 5 min after the start of stage 2 sleep. A logistic regression identiﬁed
control over and logic of thought as the two variables that predict the perception of having
fallen asleep. For sleep perception, these two variables accurately classiﬁed 91.7% of the
cases; for the waking state, 84.1%.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Sleep onset period is deﬁned as the transition from relaxed, drowsy wakefulness to unresponsive sleep. It has been ob-
served that this period is associated with marked changes in a host of physiological and behavioral phenomena, as well as in
subjective experience (Ogilvie &Wilkinson, 1984). Physiological phenomena associated with sleep onset include: decrease in
high frequency electroencephalographic (EEG) activities (e.g., Azekawa, Sei, & Morita, 1990; Davis, Davis, Loomis, Harvey, &
Hobart, 1937, 1938; Hori, 1985; Merica, Fortune, & Gaillard, 1991; Rechtschaffen & Kales, 1968; Tsuno et al., 2002); the ab-
sence and presence of different event-related potential (ERP) components (for review, see Campbell, Bell, & Bastien, 1992;
Harsh, Voss, Hull, Schrepfer, & Badia, 1994); the appearance of slow eye movements (e.g., De Gennaro, Ferrara, Ferlazzo,
& Bertini, 2000; Porte, 2004); the absence of elicited skin conductance responses (e.g., Johnson, 1970); a drop in the core
body temperature and an increase in the distal skin temperature (e.g., Barrett, Lack, & Morris, 1993; Krauchi, Cajochen,
Werth, & Wirz-Justice, 2000; Wehr, 1990); and, substantial, rapid reduction in respiration (e.g., Colrain, Trinder, Fraser, &
Wilson, 1987; Naifeh & Kamiya, 1981). Behavioral indicators of sleep onset include: a decrease in sensory threshold, a ces-
sation of responses to external stimuli (e.g., Anliker, 1966; Ogilvie & Simons, 1992; Ogilvie, Simons, Kuderian, MacDonald, &
Rustenburg, 1991; Ogilvie & Wilkinson, 1984, 1988; Ogilvie, Wilkinson, & Allison, 1989; Simon & Emmons, 1956), and a de-
crease in muscle strength (e.g., Jacobson, Kales, Lehmann, & Hoedemaker, 1964; Litchman, 1974) were also observed in the
course of the sleep onset process. And, as regards the subjective experience of sleep onset, loss of awareness of environmen-
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tal stimuli and the loss of control over thought processes have both been reported (e.g., Foulkes & Vogel, 1965; Gibson, Perry,
Redington, & Kamiya, 1982).
Although these different phenomena are all associated with sleep onset, they are not always synchronized. Thus, the cri-
teria for sleep onset identiﬁed for different studies are not consistent with one another. Most studies used physiological indi-
ces: for example, one of the most commonly used standards for sleep onset – the beginning of stage 1 sleep – is deﬁned as
the ﬁrst 30-s epoch in which EEG alpha activities decrease to less than 50% (Rechtschaffen & Kales, 1968). Other studies,
however, demonstrated that the subjective perception of falling asleep was more closely associated with stage 2 sleep, which
is characterized by diminished responsivity to external stimuli. Webb (1980) reported that from 66.7% to 85% of those who
were physically roused from sleep while in stage 2 sleep perceived this as awakening from sleep; the others did not feel as
though they had been asleep. Even higher rates of discrepancy between physical arousal and the subjective perception of
awakening were reported when assessments were made at the onset of stage 2 sleep: in several studies the percentage
of those who felt as though they had been asleep was below 50% (Amrhein & Schulz, 2000; Hori, Hayashi, & Morikawa,
1994; Sewitch, 1984).
Naturally physiological deﬁnitions of sleep onset lend themselves to stricter methodological controls. Thus, they tend to
be accepted as the standard indices of sleep onset. It is commonly assumed that physiological indications of sleep highly cor-
relate with subjectively experienced sleep. Discrepancies between the two tend to be regarded as ‘‘sleep-state mispercep-
tion.” Regarding this as a ‘‘misperception” clearly implies that physiological measures are given greater weight. In daily
life, by contrast, subjective perception is the most frequently used criterion for sleep onset. People typically judge the
amount of time taken to fall asleep merely on the basis of our subjective experience, without the evidence of any objective
indices. Relatively few studies, however, have focused on the subjective experiences that reﬂect sleep onset. Although a few
previous studies have examined the correspondence between subjective experience and electrophysiological phenomenon
during sleep onset, to the best of our knowledge, no study has explored the subjective experience that determines the per-
ception of sleep onset.
Previous studies revealed that subjective experiences occurring during sleep onset include changes in thoughts, images,
or sensations (for review, see Schacter, 1976). For example, Foulkes and Vogel (1965) collected 212 reports on the subjective
experience of sleep onset from nine, young and healthy subjects, at four distinct junctures: continuous alpha EEG with rapid
eye movements (REMs), discontinuous alpha EEG with slow eye movements (SEMs), descent into stage 1 sleep, and 0.5–
2.5 min of stage 2 sleep. The aspects of subjective experience analyzed included sensory imagery, affect, thought control,
and reality orientation. Foulkes and Vogel reported that sensory experiences were primarily visual, and remained so
throughout the sleep onset period. Thought control and reality testing were found to decrease continuously during the pro-
cess of falling asleep. Affective experience was minimal to begin with and then decreased even more after one had fallen
asleep. Foulkes and Vogel concluded that hypnagogic experience – deﬁned as a state of intermediate consciousness that pre-
cedes sleep – was quite similar to REM dream experience. This same pattern of changes in subjective experience was con-
ﬁrmed in other studies by the same research group (Vogel, Barrowclough, & Giesler, 1972; Vogel, Foulkes, & Trosman, 1966).
Similarly, Gibson and his colleagues investigated subjective experiences associated with judgments that corresponded to
physiological sleep states during the sleep onset period. They discovered that three cognitive criteria were signiﬁcantly cor-
related with correct estimation of physiological sleep states; these three were thought control, awareness of surroundings,
and temporal awareness (Gibson et al., 1982). More recently, a study utilized the absence of eyelid and head movements to
deﬁne sleep onset and collected over 1000 reports of subjective experience from 11 subjects sleeping at home. The results
were similar to those of previous studies in that they evinced a decrease in ‘‘wake-like” thoughts and an increase in dream-
like mentations from 15 s to 5 min following sleep onset (Rowley, Stickgold, & Hobson, 1998).
Furthermore, other studies used a more data-driven approach to identify the cluster of subjective experiences that are
associated with physiologically deﬁned sleep onset. For example, a study used canonical correlations to investigate the
correspondences between EEG states and subjective experiences, with subjects lying in bed during their typical bedtime.
Results showed that peak power in 2–6 Hz and 13–15 Hz bands as well as low power in 9–11 Hz and 16–25 Hz bands
were associated with a cluster of subjective experiences. These experiences included the perception of falling asleep
along with other perceptual and cognitive variables, such as altered reality-remoteness, low familiarity, sudden ideas
without goal-orientation, and lack of body perception (Lehmann, Grass, & Meier, 1995). Another study using principle
component analysis identiﬁed a dimension of subjective experience that differentiated physiologically deﬁned sleep
states (stage 1 and stage 2) from waking states. The experiences that had the highest loading included the loss of aware-
ness of the experimental situation, reported sleepiness, and inward directed attention (Wackermann, Pütz, Büchi,
Strauch, & Lehmann, 2002). Although these studies did examine subjective experience during sleep onset, their main
concern was to compare dream mentation to sleep onset experience, or to search for associations between subjective
experiences and EEG activity. They did not attempt to identify the subjective experiences that determine the perception
of falling asleep.
Previous studies have consistently demonstrated that sleep onset processes are associated with a decrease in awareness
of environmental stimuli and with diminishing thought control. But they have not clearly identiﬁed precisely what factors
are involved with the perception that we have fallen asleep. The primary goal of the current study is to probe the subjective
experiences that are critical to this perception. Subjects were awakened at several junctures during sleep onset, in order to
identify the various subjective experiences involved. Regression analyzes were then conducted in order to tease out those
experiences that are decisive in explaining perception of sleep onset.
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2. Methods
2.1. Subjects
Twenty-six subjects were recruited from a university campus, to participate in the study. Because six of them could not
fall asleep after repeated awakenings, they were excluded from data analysis. Twenty subjects (nine males and 11 females),
completed the procedures. Their mean age was 24.2 years, with a standard deviation of 3.24. The criteria for inclusion were:
(1) age between 20 and 35 years; (2) no current or past major medical or psychiatric illnesses, and no evidence of sleep dis-
orders; (3) no current use of prescribed or leisure drugs that might affect sleep; and (4) non-shift workers with regular sleep–
wake schedules. Potential subjects were screened for sleep, psychiatric, and major medical disorders in a clinical interview
conducted by a trained, clinical psychology, graduate student.
2.2. Procedure
The subjects who satisﬁed the inclusion criteria were scheduled to arrive at the sleep laboratory, based in a university, for
an afternoon-nap test. In order to enhance the likelihood that subjects would continue to fall asleep, even after repeated
experimental awakenings during the nap, they were instructed to sleep 2 h less than usual during the night prior to their
arrival at the laboratory. After obtaining the subjects’ informed consent, electrodes were attached. While the electrodes were
being positioned, the subjects were instructed to read through a list of questions that would be asked immediately after each
awakening during the course of the experiment, questions used to assess their subjective experiences. The meaning of these
questions was made clear to the subjects prior to the start of the experiment. Before beginning the nap test, the subjects
were informed that an intercom system would be used to awaken them, and that their interview would be taken immedi-
ately afterward.
The recording montage for the polysomnography (PSG) included: an electroencephalogram (EEG), with electrodes placed
at C3/A2, C4/A1, O1/A2, O2/A1; electrooculography (EOG) to measure left and right eye movements; chin electromyography
(EMG); and electrocardiography (ECG). The impedances of all electrodes were kept below 5 kX prior to the start of recording.
A total of ﬁve awakenings were conducted for each subject. The ﬁrst awakening was a practice run, to familiarize the subjects
with the procedures. It was conducted 2 min after the light was put out, regardless of whether the subject was in the wake
state or sleep state. Data from the ﬁrst awakening were not analyzed. The other four awakenings were conducted on the
basis of different PSG features, which were as follows:
1. The emergence of a clear slow eye movement (SEM).
2. The onset of stage 1 sleep, deﬁned as the ﬁrst 30-s epoch in which EEG alpha activities decreased to less than 50% (S1).
3. The onset of stage 2 sleep, as deﬁned by the emergence of a K-complex or a sleep spindle (S2)
4. A 5-min continuation of stage 2 sleep (S2+5).
In order to avoid sequence effects, sequencing of the four awakening junctures was counter-balanced across all subjects.
The awakening junctures were identiﬁed on-line by a well-trained graduate student and were independently conﬁrmed by
another well-trained graduate student.
Each time the subject was awakened, his or her name was called out through an intercom system. As soon as the ongo-
ing EEG display indicated that the subject was fully awake, an experimenter entered the bedroom and conducted the inter-
view while the subject lay in bed. During the interview the lights remained off, such that the room was just faintly
illuminated by light from the adjacent monitoring room. The experimenter assessed the subject’s perception of the sleep
state through a structured questionnaire designed to probe various aspects of subjective experience. Questions were as
follows:
1. Perception of Sleep
1-1. Sleep Perception: ‘‘Did you fall asleep?” (Y/N)
1-2. Depth of Sleep: ‘‘How deep was your sleep?” (0–5)
2. Experiences of Sensation and Perception
2-1. Clarity of Environmental Perception: ‘‘How clearly were you able to perceive any environmental stimuli?” (0–5)
2-2. Visual Image: ‘‘Did you see any visual images?” (Y/N)
2-3. Vividness of Visual Image: ‘‘How vivid was the visual image?” (0–5)
2-4. Auditory Perception: ‘‘Did you hear any sounds and/or voices?” (Y/N)
2-5. Clarity of Auditory Perception: ‘‘How clear were the sounds/voices?” (0–5)
2-6. Other Sensory Experiences: ‘‘Were there any other sensations such as bodily or olfactory sensations?” (Y/N)
2-7. Control over Perception: ‘‘Were you able to control your perceptual experiences?” (0–5)
4-1. Perceived Reality: ‘‘How real did any of the experiences seem to you?” (0–5) (This question is classiﬁed under Ori-
entation and Involvement, but was located here on the questionnaire.)
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3. Thinking Processes
3-1. Thinking Experience: ‘‘Were you thinking of anything when I called out your name?” (Y/N)
3-2. Control over Thinking Process: ‘‘How well were you able to control your thoughts?” (0–5)
3-3. Coherence of Thinking Process: ‘‘How coherent was your thinking process?” (0–5)
3-4. Logic of Thinking Process: ‘‘Were your thoughts logical?” (0–5)
4-2. Daily-life concerns: ‘‘Were the thoughts related to your daily-life concerns?” (0–5) (This question is classiﬁed
under Orientation and Involvement, but was located here on the questionnaire.)
4-3. Here-and-now experience: ‘‘Were the thoughts related to the situation in the lab?” (0–5) (This question is classiﬁed
under Orientation and Involvement, but was located here on the questionnaire.)
4. Orientation and Involvement
4-4. Sense of Involvement: ‘‘Did you feel more like an observer (0), or did the thoughts and experiences seem to be
yours (5)?” (0–5)
4-5. Orientation: ‘‘To what degree were you aware that you were in the lab and lying in bed?” (0–5)
5. Emotion
5-1. Emotional Experience: ‘‘Were you experiencing any emotion at the moment I called you?” (Y/N)
5-2. Types of Emotion: ‘‘What type of emotion did you experience?”
5-3. Valence of Emotion: ‘‘Was the emotion positive or negative?”
5-4. Intensity of Emotion: ‘‘How intense was the emotion?” (0–5)
3. Data analysis
Subject responses on the yes/no questions were analyzed ﬁrst. Chi-square was used to analyze answer frequencies for the
four junctures of awakening. Ratings for intensity of the four conditions were then compared. Since the ratings were on Lik-
ert-type scales, which are ordinal, non-parametric statistics were used. A Friedman test was employed to compare the rat-
ings among the four conditions. And, a Wilcoxon signed rank test along with Bonferroni’s correction, were used to make post
hoc comparisons.
Bivariate Spearman’s rank correlation analyzes were ﬁrst conducted to identify the variables that are associated with sub-
jective estimates of sleep depth. In order to identify the experiences that determine the subjective perception of having fallen
asleep, a forward stepwise logistic multiple regression was then conducted to identify the predictors for the response to the
binary question ‘‘did you fall asleep?”
4. Results
As expected, the average durations of time for the subjects to reach the four junctures of awakening increased from SEM
through to S2+5: they were, respectively, 189.0 s, 411.3 s, 605.9 s, and 1162.0 s. The frequencies of various subjective expe-
riences are presented in Table 1. Chi-square analyzes show that among the several conditions only Sleep Perception differed.
As expected, the perception of having fallen asleep increased throughout the sleep onset period. The Friedman’s test – com-
paring the ratings on different dimensions of subjective experience across the junctures of sleep onset – reveals that most of
the ratings (sleep depth, clarity of environmental perception, control over perception, control over thoughts, coherence of
Table 1
Frequencies, percentages, and Chi-square results for the yes/no questions.
Item Juncture of Awakening X2 df p
Y/N SEM S1 S2 S2+5
Sleep perception Y 3(15%) 8(40%) 9(45%) 16(80%) 17.37 3 .001
N 7(85%) 12(60%) 11(55%) 4(20%)
Visual image Y 6(30%) 13(65%) 11(55%) 11(55%) 5.35 3 .148
N 14(70%) 7(35%) 9(45%) 9(45%)
Auditory perception Y 10(50%) 7(35%) 4(20%) 4(20%) 5.76 3 .124
N 10(50%) 13(65%) 16(80%) 16(80%)
Other sensory exp. Y 10(50%) 6(30%) 4(20%) 4(20%) 5.71 3 .126
N 10(50%) 14(70%) 16(80%) 16(80%)
Thinking experience Y 14(70%) 11(55%) 9(45%) 9(45%) 3.37 3 .338
N 6(30%) 9(45%) 11(55%) 11(55%)
Emotional experience Y 5(25%) 2(10%) 5(25%) 0(0%) 7.06 3 .070
N 15(75%) 18(90%) 15(75%) 20(100%)
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thoughts, logic of thoughts, perceived reality, sense of involvement, and orientation) changed progressively, in step with the
appearances of physiological indices of sleep, from SEM through to S2+5. Signiﬁcant differences, however, occur at different
junctures, for different aspects of subjective experience. It appears that most changes in sensory experience occur early in the
process; later, only slight changes occurred. Changes in the thinking process also started early, but continued to change sig-
niﬁcantly even during the latter stages of sleep onset. Orientation and involvement, on the other hand, did not exhibit sig-
niﬁcant change until after the start of S1, changes which continued throughout the entire process (see Table 2 and Fig. 1).
Finally, a few aspects of subjective experience did not evince any signiﬁcant differences at the different junctures. Speciﬁc
sensory experiences, such as the vividness of visual imagery, the clarity of auditory perception, and emotional intensity, did
not signiﬁcantly differ among the four conditions.
Table 3 presents the Spearman’s correlation coefﬁcients among the variables and the subjective estimates of sleep depth.
As indicated by the table, signiﬁcant correlations were found for most of the subjective experience variables, except for viv-
idness of visual imagery, daily-life concerns, and intensity of emotion. All the variables that showed signiﬁcant correlations
were regressed onto Sleep Perception in a stepwise fashion. Logistic regression identiﬁed control over thinking process and
logic of thinking as the variables that predict sleep perception. These two variables could explain about 66% of variance in the
perception of sleep (X2(2) = 54.16, p < .001; Nagelkerke R square = .658). Control over thought processes and logic of thinking
could correctly classify 91.7% of the perception of sleep and 84.1% of the perception of waking. The overall correct rate was
87.5% (see Table 4).
5. Discussion
This study aims to explore the subjective experience of the sleep onset process and to identify those experiences that are
speciﬁcally associated with the perception of having fallen asleep. As expected, the perception of falling asleep as well as
subjective estimates of sleep depth increased at each of the four junctures of awakening. Just as has been suggested by pre-
vious studies, consistent reports of having fallen asleep were not obtained until 5 min after immersion into stage 2 sleep.
Most aspects of subjective experience also changed progressively during the course of sleep onset, but at different paces
for different domains. The perception of environmental stimuli dropped signiﬁcantly from SEM through stage 1 sleep. But
after the onset of stage 2, there was little further decline. Thought process was also shown to degenerate progressively dur-
ing the course of sleep onset. Levels of control, coherence, and logic of thought declined, from the start of SEM, but signiﬁcant
changes did not appear until the start of stage 2 sleep; decline continued even more after the subject began to sleep soundly.
Orientation and perceived reality, on the other hand, showed no signiﬁcant change from SEM to stage 1 sleep, but did change
signiﬁcantly after the inception of stage 2. In other words, signiﬁcant change did not appear until the latter stages of sleep
onset. Emotional intensity was low from the start and evinced little difference at any of the awakening junctures. These
Table 2
Means, standard deviations (SDs), and the results of Friedman’s test comparing subjective experiences among different junctures of awakening, and post hoc
tests with Wilcoxon signed rank test.
Variable SEM(A) S1(B) S2(C) S2+5(D) X2 Post hoc
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Perception of Sleep
Depth of Sleep 1.55 1.32 2.23 1.07 2.80 .97 3.40 .98 33.06*** A < B < C < D
Sensation and perception
Clarity of Environmental Perception 3.35 1.50 2.00 1.42 1.68 1.47 1.05 1.00 28.50*** A > B = C = D
Vividness of Visual Image .90 1.68 1.80 1.64 1.15 1.46 1.15 1.39 4.61
Clarity of Auditory Perception 1.09 1.79 .75 1.48 .53 1.19 .20 .52 4.63
Other Sensory Experiences 1.43 1.93 1.20 1.94 .60 1.50 .60 1.27 4.18
Control over Perception 2.90 1.86 2.33 1.59 1.70 1.45 .83 1.39 17.16** A = B = C > D
Thinking processes
Control over Thinking Process 3.40 1.70 2.25 1.74 1.33 1.26 .63 .81 30.85*** A = B, A > C > D, B = C > D
Coherence of Thinking Process 2.75 2.07 1.53 1.76 .78 1.32 .40 .88 17.57** A = B > C, A > D, B = D, C = D
Logic of Thinking Process 3.35 2.03 1.90 2.10 1.30 1.75 .60 1.05 20.98*** A = B = C, A > D, B > D, C = D
Orientation and involvement
Perceived Reality 3.70 1.59 3.43 1.04 2.43 1.52 2.05 1.64 21.57*** A = B > C = D
Daily-Life Concerns 2.20 2.19 2.90 1.68 2.45 2.09 1.65 1.84 8.05* A = B = C, A = D, B > D, C = D
Here-and-Now Experiences 2.25 2.40 2.50 2.06 1.60 1.88 .85 1.53 12.59** A = B = C, A = D, B > D, C = D
Sense of Involvement 3.95 1.54 3.10 1.97 2.48 2.07 1.68 1.76 15.07** A = B, A > C = D, B = C = D
Orientation 4.05 1.70 3.33 1.78 2.33 1.89 1.25 1.55 34.52*** A = B > C > D
Emotion
Intensity of Emotion .73 1.33 .48 1.27 .45 1.05 0 0 7.15
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
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ﬁndings are consistent with previous studies that revealed signiﬁcant change in sensory and thought process during sleep
onset, while emotional experiences maintained a low intensity throughout (e.g., Foulkes & Vogel, 1965; Gibson et al., 1982;
Hori, Hayashi, & Hibino, 1992; Hori, Hayashi, & Morikawa, 1991).
This study’s most signiﬁcant ﬁnding is that control over the thinking process is the most prominent subjective experience
that is associated with the judgment of having fallen asleep. Thought logic was also identiﬁed as a predictor for falling asleep.
In addition, our study showed that although sensory processing decrease and thinking process degeneration began early in
sleep onset, degeneration continued after immersion into light sleep and more stable sleep. But perception of environmental
stimuli showed relatively less diminution. And, degree of orientation was not signiﬁcantly affected until after stage 2 sleep
had been achieved.
Our results may help explain the ﬁndings of previous studies which reveal that subjects did not perceive sleep onset until
after stable, stage 2 sleep had been achieved. As mentioned above, reports of having slept were more closely associated with
Fig. 1. The ratings on subjective experiences with statistically signiﬁcant changes over the four junctures (SEM: slow eye movement, S1: stage 1 sleep, S2:
stage 2 sleep, and S2+5: 5 min of stable stage 2 sleep) during sleep onset period. Asterisk represents signiﬁcant difference onWilcoxon signed rank test with
Bonferroni’s correction.
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the occurrence of stage 2 sleep than with stage 1 sleep. Perception of sleep was previously reported to be related to substan-
tially diminished responsivity to visual and auditory stimuli (Agnew & Webb, 1972). But Bonnet (1986) demonstrated that
although the auditory threshold increased soon after the appearance of the sleep spindle, perceptions of having fallen asleep
were not reported until several minutes later. Bonnet’s ﬁndings are in line with our results, that the perception of sleep onset
is more associated with deteriorating thought processes than with perception of external stimuli. One might perceive oneself
as being awake, even after the perception of environmental stimuli abates. What seems to be required for the perception of
having fallen asleep is substantial loss of control over the thought process along with deterioration of logical reasoning, phe-
nomena that obtain after one enters a period of sustained stage 2 sleep.
As Rechtschaffen (1994) stated, ‘‘there are separate effector mechanisms that control the different behavioral conditions
that, when considered together, constitute ‘sleep’.” Our results also support the ﬁnding that sleep onset is not a single pro-
cess; rather, it is parallel processes that comprise multiple components. Changes in different aspects of subjective experience
may reﬂect different underlying mechanisms. The different mechanisms may operate at different rates, thereby correspond-
ing to differential rates of change in subjective experience. Some of the mechanisms may be reﬂected in the physiological
phenomenon that we use to deﬁne sleep onset or sleep stages, while others may not. Previous studies have shown that
the decline in EEG alpha activity is associated with the subjective report of loss of awareness of the environment (Davis
et al., 1937); this is consistent with our ﬁndings that the onset of stage 1 sleep is associated with a decline in perception
of environmental stimuli. A recent study also showed that the clarity of mental content and controllability of thought both
diminish after the onset of stage 2 sleep (Weigand, Michael, & Schulz, 2007). In our study, control over thinking was found to
continue to decline throughout stage 1 and stage 2 sleep, and orientation and involvement were found to decrease after the
inception of stage 2 sleep.
Recent studies have also combined EEG and brain imaging techniques in order to explore changes in region-speciﬁc brain
activity during sleep. The ﬁndings obtained from these studies suggest a global decrease in cerebral and thalamic activity
during non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep. But the speciﬁc brain regions identiﬁed as responsible for the changes varied
somewhat. Generally speaking though, light sleep was associated with decreased activity in the frontal and parietal areas of
Table 3
Spearman correlation coefﬁcients among different domains of subjective experience with subjective estimates of depth of sleep.
Depth of sleep p
Experiences of sensation and perception
Clarity of Environmental Perception .596*** <.001
Vividness of Visual Image .170 .131
Clarity of auditory perception .235* .036
Other Sensory Experiences .208 .064
Control over Perception .583*** <.001
Thinking processes
Control over Thinking Process .685*** <.001
Coherence of Thinking Process .527*** <.001
Logic of Thinking Process .605*** <.001
Orientation and Involvement
Perceived Reality .502*** <.001
Daily-Life Concerns .184 .102
Here-and-Now Experiences .277* .013
Sense of Involvement .305** .006
Orientation .625*** <.001
Emotion
Intensity of Emotion .251* .025
*** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the .001 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is signiﬁcant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
Table 4
The percentage of correct prediction of perceived sleep with the predictors identiﬁed using logistic multiple regression.
Observed Predicted
Awake Asleep Percentage correct
Model 1 Awake 37 7 84.1
Asleep 5 31 86.1
Overall percentage 85.0
Model 2 Awake 37 7 84.1
Asleep 3 33 91.7
Overall percentage 87.5
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the cortex and in the thalamus. Deep sleep is characterized by a further decrease in activity in these areas, as well as within
the basal ganglia (e.g., Balkin et al., 2002; Braun et al., 1997, 1998; Finelli, Baumann, Borbély, & Achermann, 2000; Kjaer,
Nowak, & Lou, 2002; Maquet, 2000; Nofzinger, Mintun, Wiseman, Kupfer, & Moore, 1997; Nofzinger et al., 2002; Peigneux
et al., 2001). As for stage 1 sleep, Czisch and his colleagues reported fMRI indications of reduced activation in both the audi-
tory and visual cortex in response to auditory stimuli, as demonstrated by a decrease in the blood-oxygenation (Czisch et al.,
2002). Also concerning stage 1 sleep, Kaufmann and colleagues’ (2006) fMRI studies indicated decreased activation in the
thalamic and cingulate structures, other limbic areas, frontal lobes, occipital lobes, temporal lobes, and the insula. These
changes may be responsible for a diminution of sensory and thought processes after achieving stage 1 sleep. Stage 2 sleep,
on the other hand, was associated with decreased activity in the thalamic and hypothalamic regions, cingulate cortex, right
insula and adjacent regions of the temporal lobe, the inferior parietal lobule, as well as the inferior and middle frontal gyri
(Kaufmann et al., 2006). These studies when coupled with our ﬁndings suggest that diminution of activity in these areas may
be responsible for the loss of orientation and self awareness that occurs in stage 2 sleep. Unfortunately though, no detailed
subjective experiences were assessed in these brain imaging studies. Knowledge of the relevant neural correlates of these
subjective experiences must await future studies.
It should perhaps be noted that the changes in degree of control over and in the logic of thought documented here are not
necessarily sustained throughout the entirety of sleep. Several recent comparisons of waking and dream thought have moti-
vated a reﬁnement of prior distinctions: neither, it seems, is dream cognition as inherently deﬁcient in the ways that some
have argued, nor is waking cognition as proﬁcient. According to a moderate revision of the distinction, dream thought should
not be understood monolithically (Kahn & Hobson, 2005). For example, there appear to be two distinct types: one employs
context logic, which reasons from premises; the other, state logic (metacognition), which reasons about premises. It is only
the latter that is absent in the dream state. According to a more robust revision of the distinction, dreaming and waking cog-
nition do not differ qualitatively (Kahan, LaBerge, Levitan, & Zimbardo, 1997). Reﬂective awareness and other metacognitive
experiences might well be more common in dream cognition than is typically believed; that such experiences are seldom
reported might be more a reﬂection of methodological artifact than of actual dream experience. Possible differences between
moderate and more robust revisions of the distinction between waking and dream thought need not be adjudicated here. It
need only be pointed out that both sets of studies suggest that some measure of what is lost when subjects perceive the
onset of sleep is later recovered when dream cognition commences.
A possible limitation of the current study is that it was conducted on daytime naps rather than nocturnal sleep. It is per-
haps arguable that correlations between subjective experiences of sleep onset and physiological indices of sleep onset differ,
depending upon whether one is napping or engaged in nighttime sleep. Although such a view is neither motivated by current
theory nor by empirical evidence, to rule out this possibility further, supplementary studies should be carried out.
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